Politicians aim to exert control over the public administration to gain access to government resources and shape policy outcomes. However, diminished influence can introduce management hurdles, eroding political power and election prospects. In this paper, I investigate how politicians facing reduced political clout distribute public sector employment to maintain control over the local administration. I establish causality by leveraging a legislative reform in Brazil setting the maximum number of local legislators based on population thresholds. Combining data on elected city councilors, 200,000 campaign donors, and administrative labor market registries, I document four empirical findings. First, an increase in the legislature size leads to a 29 percent increase in the likelihood of landing a civil service job for political supporters. Second, appointments concentrate on top managerial roles, hinting at discretionary allotments influencing policy-making. Third, civil servants already part of the local administration are more likely to be reassigned to top-tier management roles. Fourth, these discretionary nominations lead to the selection of less-skilled individuals.