How do authoritarian regimes and their supporters use social media to suppress regime threats during periods of international scrutiny? We argue that, when heightened global attention constrains more overt forms of repression, pro-regime actors inundate prominent dissidents with hostile social media engagement to covertly suppress threats to the state's international reputation. In particular, prominent exiled dissidents are likely targets of this behavior because they are uniquely positioned to mobilize international pressure. We test this argument using a corpus of social media interactions with prominent Uyghur activists-in-exile between 2017 and 2022—a period of increased international attention on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). With these data, we assess temporal shifts in alignment with the strategic interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in two ways. First, we test whether cross-document cosine similarities—our measure of content coordination—increase following the U.S. State Department's pivotal declaration of genocide in January 2021. Second, we employ Large Language Models (LLMs) to quantify temporal shifts in content that deflects widespread criticism of the PRC during this period. Our findings have important implications for understanding digital authoritarianism and the role of social media in transnational repression.