In contexts of local state capture, can negative economic shocks reduce elite influence in politics? We focus on the impact of natural hazards, which have been shown to have significant negative economic effects and which, therefore, might be capable of limiting local state capture. Where natural hazards undermine the economic interests of local elites, this may reduce the resources that elites can commit to campaign contributions through which they exert political influence. Alternatively, campaign income might increase in response to natural hazards if local elite capture extends to increases in government transfers that follow the occurrence of hazards. We explore these expectations using a difference-in-difference design in Colombia, where climate- and weather-related natural hazards such as flooding and landslides are increasingly frequent and widespread. Our results show that natural hazards significantly increase campaign contributions for mayoral candidates in municipal elections. Moreover, this increase is driven by personal contributions from candidates and their direct relatives. Further analysis suggests two possible and compatible explanations for this: an increase in economic capacity through the capture of transfers and an increase in incentives due to discretionary spending powers.