Since the difficult ratification of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and, even more so, the failure of the Constitutional treaty in 2005, European issues have become more salient in national politics. Simultaneously, popular support for European integration has decreased, while Eurosceptic parties have gained votes. Criticism of the EU has become legitimate and commonplace over the last two decades, spreading even among leaders and parties who declare themselves Europhile. Alongside discourses from anti-EU parties that reject explicitly the European project, pro-EU actors criticize the path the EU is taking more openly. We argue that this "Euro-alternativism" (FitzGibbon 2013) creates an “ambivalent discursive environment”, that sends mixed signals in the public space.

This paper studies the evolution of criticism towards the EU among the elites as reported in the media. Using France as a case study, its aim is to present a proof of concept for an index of "Euro-Ambivalence", defined as a ratio between different discourse regarding the EU, from strict opposition to full promotion through criticism and alternativism. I use media reports as the main source because we know that most political issues are beyond the range of personal experience. People know mostly about politics indirectly through the media, rather than direct communication from the parties. Therefore, what the media filter matters. This study follows a constructionist approach that focuses on “critical discourse moments” (Gamson 1992) since the last European elections before Maastricht (1989) until December 2020 when the Brexit is acted.