Fluctuations of political power might come with widespread consequences for economic development as they may hinder governments from carrying out long-term policies. We ask if such electoral volatility could be a result of voters reacting to changes in the candidate supply in an environment with clientelistic ties between politicians and voters. We use voter-level register data from the 19th-century poll books from nine English parliamentary constituencies. Prior to the Secret Ballot Act of 1872, voting in the United Kingdom was public. These data allow us to track individual voters over time and explore how they react to changes in the candidate supply, conditional on their past voting behavior. We document some persistence in vote choices using such data over the years 1832-1868 despite the weak party system. Yet, almost one third of voters in our data change their vote choice between two consecutive elections. We find that voters who voted for an exiting candidate in the previous election are around 2 percentage points more likely to change their partisan voting behavior in the subsequent election than those voters whose previously chosen candidates reran. While the effect is moderate, our results indicate that candidate turnover explains part of the electoral volatility observed at the aggregate level in the era.