15:30 - 17:45
Friday-Panel
Chair/s:
Lukas Rudolph, Tina Margarete Freyburg
Discussant/s:
Lukas Rudolph, Tina Margarete Freyburg
Section A - Meeting Room D

Ellen Lust
Clientelism, Credibility, and Context

Edgar Cook, Jan Vogler
What Determines American Citizens' Views of the Administrative State? The Roles of Political Affiliation, Value Systems, Experience, and Bureaucratic Performance

Tina Freyburg, Lisa Garbe, Keith McManamen
Ownership of telecom companies and internet disruptions

Kristen Kao, Ellen Lust
Signal of Strength? Clientelism and Voters’ Expectations of Politicians’ Performance in Malawi and Zambia


Section B - Meeting Room S

Amuitz Garmendia Madariaga, Sandra Leon
Evidence of In-group and Out-group Dynamics in Subcentral Benchmarking

Francesco Granella
Campaign money for nothing? Understanding the consequences of a ban on corporate contributions: evidence from Brazil

Lukas Rudolph, Franziska Quoss, Thomas Bernauer
NIMBYism and mass public preferences in public goods provision – evidence from mobile phone antenna placement in Switzerland
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Campaign money for nothing? Understanding the consequences of a ban on corporate contributions: evidence from Brazil
Francesco Granella 1, Alexandros Cavgias 2
1 Bocconi University
2 Universitat de Barcelona

We study the effects of the 2015 ban on corporate contributions in Brazil on the allocation of procurement contracts and the frequency of large personal contributions of corporate members, a channel to circumvent the ban. We use difference in differences regression models that compare outcomes of contributing and non-contributing firms before and after the ban. We document three findings. First, before the ban, contributing firms won 20 to 25% more procurement tenders per year than non-contributing firms. Second, the ban on corporate contributions significantly decreased the number of national procurement contracts won by contributing firms by 2 to 11 percentage points, a magnitude that only partially offset their previous advantage. Third, firms previously making large contributions circumvent the ban in both national and local elections with donations from owners and board members. Together, our findings suggest that a ban on corporate contributions have limited effects on the average influence of contributing firms when there are mechanisms to circumvent the ban.

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