Most research on legislative cohesion suggests that electoral systems that incentivize legislators to cultivate a personal vote generate less cohesive parties. Scholars expect reelection incentives to undercut legislative cohesion because deviating from the party helps legislators enhance their personal reputations. In contrast, this article posits that reelection incentives can increase legislative cohesion in places with clientelistic parties. It can do so, because party leaders are able to condition legislators' access to particularistic benefits on legislators' loyalty to the party's agenda. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the ideological placement of Mexican local legislators by applying correspondence analysis to a new dataset of over half a million individual speeches given by legislators to their respective local congresses in 20 Mexican states from 2012 to 2018. Conducting a difference-in-differences analysis that leverages the staggered implementation of the 2014 Mexican Electoral Reform, which lifted a constitutional ban on reelection established in 1933, I find that the introduction of reelection incentives increases legislative cohesion and that the effect is driven by SSD-elected legislators.