15:30 - 17:45
Friday-Panel
Chair/s:
Lukas Rudolph, Tina Margarete Freyburg
Discussant/s:
Lukas Rudolph, Tina Margarete Freyburg
Section A - Meeting Room D

Ellen Lust
Clientelism, Credibility, and Context

Edgar Cook, Jan Vogler
What Determines American Citizens' Views of the Administrative State? The Roles of Political Affiliation, Value Systems, Experience, and Bureaucratic Performance

Tina Freyburg, Lisa Garbe, Keith McManamen
Ownership of telecom companies and internet disruptions

Kristen Kao, Ellen Lust
Signal of Strength? Clientelism and Voters’ Expectations of Politicians’ Performance in Malawi and Zambia


Section B - Meeting Room S

Amuitz Garmendia Madariaga, Sandra Leon
Evidence of In-group and Out-group Dynamics in Subcentral Benchmarking

Francesco Granella
Campaign money for nothing? Understanding the consequences of a ban on corporate contributions: evidence from Brazil

Lukas Rudolph, Franziska Quoss, Thomas Bernauer
NIMBYism and mass public preferences in public goods provision – evidence from mobile phone antenna placement in Switzerland
Signal of Strength? Clientelism and Voters’ Expectations of Politicians’ Performance in Malawi and Zambia
Kristen Kao, Ellen Lust
University of Gothenburg

How do clientelistic appeals affect voters' expectations of politicians' future performance? This paper examines this question, focusing on three dimensions of clientelism: the existence of cash or other goods at election time (often termed 'vote-buying'), the promise of future targeted benefits, and the degree of contingency involved. It employs a conjoint experiment, embedded in a unique survey of over 12,000 respondents in Malawi and Zambia, focus group discussions and observational data. We find that clientelistic behaviors during an election campaign have a greater impact on voters' perceptions of the candidates' future performance than it does on their willingness to support the candidate at the polls. Voters are less likely to have confidence in candidates offering handouts, seeing them as more likely to be corrupt, less likely to provide services, and less likely to mobilize resources; they prefer future promises of targeted future assistance over club goods, but they do not believe that candidates are likely to actually follow through on this promise; and they dislike explicitly contingent offers of service provision in exchange for political support. These findings draw into question expectations that handouts signal future service provision (e.g., the 'big man' hypothesis) and suggest that clientelism affects not only election outcomes, but citizens' confidence in their elected officials.