Not all aid is welcome. Aid targeted at minorities or other marginalized groups in recipient countries is a common donor priority but may generate backlash from majority group constituents jealous of the allocation. If politicians are attributed credit for aid that their locality receives, they may also be attributed blame for the locality's unpopular aid. The logic of credit-claiming in aid implies the existence of blame-attribution for unpopular aid. I develop a theory of how blame-attribution and donor-driven incentives to promote aid for vulnerable populations reduce support for incumbent politicians. A case study of Kosovo illustrates the dynamic of political backlash against elected officials who are in power when aid to an unpopular minority is delivered by international actors. I use a natural experiment based on the random timing of the Life in Transition Survey in relation to the start, implementation, and completion of aid projects to identify the political cost of unpopular aid for recipient incumbent politicians. I find that exposure to aid to marginalized groups negatively affects support for local and national governments and increases support for right-wing parties. Donor attempts to help vulnerable populations may lead to backlash that empowers anti-minority parties, making the political landscape of recipient countries more dangerous for the groups they sought to aid.