15:30 - 17:45
Friday-Panel
Chair/s:
Santiago López-Cariboni
Discussant/s:
Santiago López-Cariboni
Meeting Room G

Denise Laroze, Charles Noussair, Ximena Quintanilla, Paulina Granados, Mauricio Lopez
Improving Pension Information: Experimental Evidence on Willingness to Learn Using Online Resources

Alexander Kustov, Maikol Cerda, Ian Shapiro, Frances Rosenbluth
Party Institutions and Social Welfare

Tarik Abou-Chadi, Silja Häusermann, Reto Mitteregger, Nadja Mosimann, Markus Wagner
European social democracy and the trade-offs of party competition in post-industrial societies
Party Institutions and Social Welfare
Alexander Kustov, Maikol Cerda, Ian Shapiro, Frances Rosenbluth
Yale University

It is widely acknowledged that democracy affects economic growth and social welfare. The existing political economy literature, however, rarely disaggregates political institutions in ways that generate testable propositions about causal mechanisms. Our project seeks to advance this important strand of research by reconceptualizing both the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, we argue that stronger party systems, characterized by electoral competition between few disciplined parties, are more likely to implement effective government policies that generate inclusive economic growth than weaker systems with undisciplined or multiple coalition parties. We then show that government investments in early childhood education and care (ECEC) and family in-kind benefits are especially good at promoting long-term social welfare. To test our argument, we estimate the effect of party institutions on such future-oriented government spending by exploiting the timing of major changes to party discipline and fragmentation in an original dataset covering the last forty years in OECD countries. Overall, we show that political systems in which parties are large and disciplined are more likely to spend on effective public policies.