Voters often express mistrust in elected officials’ stated desires to help their constituents. They argue that politicians come bringing gifts and promises during elections, never to be seen until the next election comes. But how widespread are these sentiments? And, do perceptions of candidates vary depending on how closely knit their community is? This paper examines these questions, employing a conjoint experiment embedded in a unique survey in Malawi and Zambia, where a heavily clustered sampling strategy allowed for the collection of village- and individual-level data. It finds evidence that candidate characteristics, clientelistic offers and community characteristics all affect citizens’ expectations of services. Specifically, individuals in communities that are tightly knit are more skeptical that candidates will make good on their promises. Still, they are more likely to prefer candidates who reward communities that vote together than candidates who do not. These findings highlight the importance of considering how communities’ experiences with clientelism affect expectations regarding service provision. In communities where individuals know each other, the information flow that supports clientelism is stronger, and clientelistic offers may be more likely. Candidates find it both easier and more reliable to mobilize blocs of votes in these areas. However, once elected, politicians are not necessarily more likely to follow through with electoral promises. The result is that voters may be less likely to perceive such candidates as distributing resources in the future.