15:30 - 17:45
Friday-Panel
Chair/s:
Lukas Rudolph, Tina Margarete Freyburg
Discussant/s:
Lukas Rudolph, Tina Margarete Freyburg
Section A - Meeting Room D

Ellen Lust
Clientelism, Credibility, and Context

Edgar Cook, Jan Vogler
What Determines American Citizens' Views of the Administrative State? The Roles of Political Affiliation, Value Systems, Experience, and Bureaucratic Performance

Tina Freyburg, Lisa Garbe, Keith McManamen
Ownership of telecom companies and internet disruptions

Kristen Kao, Ellen Lust
Signal of Strength? Clientelism and Voters’ Expectations of Politicians’ Performance in Malawi and Zambia


Section B - Meeting Room S

Amuitz Garmendia Madariaga, Sandra Leon
Evidence of In-group and Out-group Dynamics in Subcentral Benchmarking

Francesco Granella
Campaign money for nothing? Understanding the consequences of a ban on corporate contributions: evidence from Brazil

Lukas Rudolph, Franziska Quoss, Thomas Bernauer
NIMBYism and mass public preferences in public goods provision – evidence from mobile phone antenna placement in Switzerland
Clientelism, Credibility, and Context
Ellen Lust
University of Gothenburg

Voters often express mistrust in elected officials’ stated desires to help their constituents. They argue that politicians come bringing gifts and promises during elections, never to be seen until the next election comes. But how widespread are these sentiments? And, do perceptions of candidates vary depending on how closely knit their community is? This paper examines these questions, employing a conjoint experiment embedded in a unique survey in Malawi and Zambia, where a heavily clustered sampling strategy allowed for the collection of village- and individual-level data. It finds evidence that candidate characteristics, clientelistic offers and community characteristics all affect citizens’ expectations of services. Specifically, individuals in communities that are tightly knit are more skeptical that candidates will make good on their promises. Still, they are more likely to prefer candidates who reward communities that vote together than candidates who do not. These findings highlight the importance of considering how communities’ experiences with clientelism affect expectations regarding service provision. In communities where individuals know each other, the information flow that supports clientelism is stronger, and clientelistic offers may be more likely. Candidates find it both easier and more reliable to mobilize blocs of votes in these areas. However, once elected, politicians are not necessarily more likely to follow through with electoral promises. The result is that voters may be less likely to perceive such candidates as distributing resources in the future.