How do internal minorities fare under ethno-territorial autonomy arrangements? This article follows assertions that such groups are more likely to become involved in violent conflict for two reasons: First, reputation theory suggests that they might mobilize for the creation of their own homelands. Second, case studies indicate that they will be more frequently targeted in acts of local ethnic cleansing. Building on both, I argue that the creation of ethno-territorial homelands increases conflict risks for internal minorities especially if they were created amid recent violent contestation. This emboldens internal minorities to exert similar violent pressures of their own. At the same time, local majority groups are conscious of these risks. Thereby, they face incentives for preemptive strikes in order to secure their newly-attained homeland. Using a new, geo-coded dataset of territorial autonomy for more than 100 countries since the Second World War, I test these arguments on the territorial unit-group-year level. The findings indicate that the risks of becoming involved in political violence are indeed exacerbated for internal minorities living in other groups' homelands. Yet, they also suggest that these risks can be mitigated by investments in individual cultural rights and mutual security guarantees.