13:15 - 15:30
Friday-Panel
Chair/s:
Federica Genovese
Discussant/s:
Sebastian Ziaja
Meeting Room J

Nicole Baerg
Dividends of Power: The Governance of Contemporary Resource Management

Federica Genovese, Lorenzo Crippa
Papal Dividends: Do Popes’ Political Communications Move Economic Markets?

Anders Wieland
The Economic Legacy of Early Democracy

Prisca Jöst, Ellen Lust
Neighborhood Social Ties and Compliance among the Poor
Dividends of Power: The Governance of Contemporary Resource Management
Nicole Baerg
University of Essex

Do patron–client networks impeded economic development and lead to political disatisfaction among those left behind areas or do they facilitate faster, more equitable regional growth and greater satisfaction among residents? In this article, I argue that local patron–client networks leads to more unequal distribution of resources, greater variation in economic growth, and more within-region hostility to politics. I show that while patronage networks improve economic performance of favoured locations because they leave unfavoured locations behind, they also increase local animosities raising feelings of "relative deprivation". I test this claim by examining patronage networks amongst local board members and project funding recipients in the Rocky Mountain river basin region in Canada. Using an original regional-district–level panel data set between 2000 and 2020 and text analysis that identified patronage ties, I show that while areas with greater informal ties deliver significantly faster economic growth than those without, left behind regions also show greater disatisfaction with local politics.