Authoritarian regimes suffer from inherent information asymmetry problems. Prior research has shown how dictators have created different channels including formal institutions that mitigate the problem of information collection. However, less attention has been paid to what kind of information authoritarian regimes value and act upon. In particular, it remains unexplored whether regimes value good information or demonstrations of loyalty. Anecdotal evidence, for instance, from the famine in China between 1958 and 1961 suggests that authoritarian regimes are unable to process information accurately. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes often justify the creation of consultative mechanisms as efforts to rationalize policymaking. Drawing on an original dataset of proposals and government responses to a Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference (PPCC) in China, this paper analyzes precisely how the authoritarian government reacts to different kinds of information that it receives. In particular, it is assessing whether high-quality information will be appreciated more by government agencies or whether the identity of the proposer is more decisive in determining the governments’ responses.