Economic voting is commonly seen as a cornerstone of democratic ac-countability. Influential work has argued that globalization attenuates it byblurring responsibility and constraining the room to maneuver of domesticgovernments (Hellwig,2001). Here, we test whether this argument extendsto another factor that also reduces policy maneuver: membership in Supra-national Institutions. In a pre-registered survey experiment fielded in Spainin May 2018, we manipulate both information about economic performanceand about the Eurozone rules that constrain domestic policy-making. Theevidence provides no support for theroom to maneuverhypothesis: unlikeglobalization, supranational constraintsdo notattenuate accountability forbad economic outcomes. Instead, they lead to a backlash against both the in-cumbent and other mainstream parties. We interpret the evidence as sugges-tive that voters blame these parties for having consented to the supranationalrules in the first place. These results show that the room to maneuver ar-gument formulated by the globalization literature cannot simply be extendedto membership of supranational organizations. This has important implica-tions to understand the electoral consequences of integration in internationalorganizations and the capacity of incumbents using them as scapegoats.