17:45 - 20:00
Thursday-Panel
Chair/s:
Aliza Forman-Rabinovici
Discussant/s:
Raymond Duch
Meeting Room Q

David Sylvan, Jean-Louis Arcand, Ashley Thornton
Modeling How Elites Interpret Policy Announcements: Russia, the Federal Reserve, and the New York Times

Aliza Forman-Rabinovici
The Prevalence and Impact of Gender Blindness on Political Science Research

Thomas König, Xiao Lu
Helping or Sanctioning? Heterogeneous Effects in the Strategic Analysis of International Compliance

Elena Llaudet
Effects of Assigned Collaboration on Student Performance: Results from an Experiment

Jennifer Oser
Protest as one political act in participation repertoires: A latent class analysis of the relationship between civic duty and protest
Helping or Sanctioning? Heterogeneous Effects in the Strategic Analysis of International Compliance
Thomas König 1, Xiao Lu 2
1 University of Mannheim
2 University of Mannheim

To address non-compliance, scholars controversially discuss which type of state - an incapable or an unwilling type - determines the structure of the game between an international organization and a state. Observational studies accordingly attempt to identify the dominance of one of the two types when they use conditional mean estimators, such as probit or logit, for a set of covariates, which describe the players' utilities. In this paper, we show that averaged effects can lead to biased or even false identification of state types. We introduce a strategic quantile model to reveal heterogeneous effects in strategic sequential games of compliance. Our re-examination of a compliance study demonstrates that both incapacity and unwillingness determine the structure of the strategic compliance game.