17:45 - 20:00
Thursday-Panel
Chair/s:
Raimondas Ibenskas
Discussant/s:
Raimondas Ibenskas
Meeting Room K

Liran Harsgor, Reut Itzkovitch-Malka, Or Tuttnauer
Vote switching and Coalition-Directed Voting: A Panel Study of Repeat Elections in Israel

Thomas König, Xiao Lu, Thiago Nascimento da Silva, Nikoleta Yordanova, Galina Zudenkova
Cooperation and Competition: Coalition Governance and Timing of Bill Initiation

David Fortunato, Randolph Stevenson
How Voters Predict Coalition Bargaining Outcomes

Anthea Alberto
Don’t Promise What You Won’t Deliver: Policy-Making in Coalition Governments
How Voters Predict Coalition Bargaining Outcomes
David Fortunato 1, 2, Randolph Stevenson 3, Seonghui Lee 4
1 University of California, San Diego
2 Copenhagen Business School
3 Rice University
4 University of Essex

Multiparty parliamentary democracies present an interesting problem to voters: in order to cast a policy-oriented vote, they must first come to have some expectations of how likely various coalition governments are to form following the election. While there is some research suggesting that voters do, in fact, possess such expectations, it is unclear how they are generated. We present an ecologically rational theory of how voters form coalition expectations and derive global and contextual (i.e., cross-nationally variant) empirical expectations. To test these predictions, we design an experimental platform that allows us to learn the rules voters use to infer which parties will coalesce, as well as how these rules vary across contexts.