Can economic redistribution policies in autocratic regimes shape post-transitional extremism aligned with the past? This paper shows that the exposure to autocratic redistribution programmes and their subsequent loss after transitions to democracy increases the likelihood of voting for extremist-parties aligned with the former regime. Popular support has been shown to be a crucial element for the long-term stability of undemocratic regimes, particularly, when it comes to tackling threats coming from the population. Existing studies have mostly focused on the importance of ideology in creating latent support towards dictatorships and shaping autocratic legacies. In addition to ideology, and adopting a rational-choice logic, I argue that the top-down provision of economic benefits by autocratic elites creates a relationship of self-interested dependence with the population that does not merely disappear with the fall of the regime. Using original data from Western European dictatorships — namely, data on the Nazi Welfare Programs —, I empirically show that after transitions to democracy, if the benefits provided during the former regime are jeopardised in the new democratic context, this will trigger the vote for extremist parties aligned with the former regime. Individuals that were more exposed to autocratic redistribution programs will tend to vote for extremist parties aligned with the former regime increases whenever: (i) those economic benefits are lost after transitions to democracy; (ii) and there are high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy.