An inherent practical aspect of democratic rule is how politicians are rewarded for serving in office. Remunerations affect political recruitment, as they motivate some citizens to run for office, and recent studies suggest that serving in political office is financially beneficial in the short run and can be in the long run too. The existing studies mostly concern professional, full-time politicians who receive a full-time salary and leave the ordinary labor market while serving in office. Part-time politicians, on the other hand, make up a large share of the elected office-holders at subnational-levels, and are essential for public service provision in modern democracies. Being part-time officeholder take up time and energy, which on one hand might cause sacrifices in their ordinary professional job, but on the other hand provide a stepping stone for a political career and an opportunity for reaping local board memberships.

I add knowledge about returns to political office of part-time politicians by studying local councilors in Denmark. I rely on administrative data linked to electoral data of the universe of political candidates in Danish municipality elections from 1993-2013. By comparing marginal winners and losers, I estimate that entering a part-time political position increase annual earnings by about €12.000 - a substantially large income increase, which is persistent for years until vanishing at last. As a second contribution, I link my data to novel administrative data on board memberships to better understand the dynamics and mechanisms underlying the substantially large returns enjoyed by the political amateurs.