13:15 - 15:30
Thursday-Panel
Chair/s:
Julie Hassing Nielsen
Discussant/s:
Julia Schulte-Cloos
Meeting Room K

Christopher Anderson, Sara Hobolt
Changing Norms in Times of Crisis: Citizens, Masks, and Political Information During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Citizens, Masks, and Political Information During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Wang Leung Ting
Impact of House of Common hybrid proceeding on members participation during COVID-19 pandemic

Julie Hassing Nielsen
Loyalty in the Face of Adversity? Exploring party loyalty during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis in Sweden and Denmark

Davide Morisi, Max Schaub, Guillaume Kon-Kam-King, Héloïse Cloléry
Incumbency voting, right-wing support, and the threat of Covid-19: the case of France

Moritz Marbach, Dalston Ward, Dominik Hangartner
How COVID-19 Lockdown Policies Weaken Civic Attitudes in the United States and Europe
Changing Norms in Times of Crisis: Citizens, Masks, and Political Information During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Christopher Anderson, Sara Hobolt
London School of Economics and Political Science

The widespread and mandatory use of face masks in response to the COVID-19 pandemic represents a sudden, unprecedented change in individual and social behaviour in the Western world. In this study, we argue that creating new social and political rules for behaviour like mask wearing – behaviour that is individually practiced but has collective benefits – is akin to designing new formal and informal institutions in response to a sudden and severe crisis. What drives public acceptance of these new rules? Using a vignette experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey conducted during the first wave of the pandemic in the UK, we examine the effects of information about the virus and public authority on people’s beliefs about the desirability of the rules, which rules they prefer, who should make them, and how they should be enforced. We argue that information about the individual and collective risks of non-compliance will induce citizens to accept new rules and enforce them, especially if the information comes from a trusted source. Results show that simply providing such information indeed heightens people’s willingness to create new and stringent rules and to enforce them vigorously. However, compliance with new rules is not a partisan matter or connected to allegiance to political authority: we find no significant differences in people’s preferences between supporters of the government or opposition parties. Our results suggest that citizens are easily persuaded to accept new and intrusive restrictions on private behaviours for the benefit of society as a whole.