Committee chairs hold crucial positions in the legislative process. With their prerogatives ex officio they can push or quell legislative initiatives and are pivotal in the government's agenda. While previous studies have examined which party receive which committee chair, less is known about committee chair appointment within parties. We examine who ruling parties (principal) appoint to committee chairs (agent) in order to minimize the risk of policy moving away from government positions. Using data on Japanese Members of Parliament from 2003 to 2017 we test theoretical expectations derived from the principal-agent framework. Japan makes an ideal case to study intra-party chair appointment due to its coalitions' office allocation patterns. We find that parties appoint MPs who are ideologically closer to the cabinet's position to chair positions on committees with jurisdiction on high and foreign policy. However, we find no effect of ideological distance on chair appointments on particularistic committees. Our findings are robust across cabinets, parties and variation in committee classifications. These findings contribute to our understanding of political appointments and legislative processes.