In this paper, I study to what extent the global financial crisis affected business interest groups’ success. Previous research indicate that it is more difficult for business interest groups to influence policy outcomes during periods of higher political salience, such as the global financial crisis. I argue that while at the onset of the crisis the success rate decreased, this is no longer the case at a later stage.
On the basis of the preference attainment approach, this paper seeks to analyse the congruence between business interest groups preferences and the political decisions before and after the global financial crisis. Empirically, I analyse three economic policies characterized by higher levels of issue salience: financial regulation, tax policy and corporate governance. The paper focus on Switzerland, given not only the important role operated by its financial sector, but also its corporatism democracy model, since recent research argue that the parliamentary arena has gained in importance vis-à-vis the executive one in corporatist countries. In doing so, the effectiveness of business interest groups’ lobbying is measured by comparing their preferences with the decisions taken in the economic affairs and taxation committees. Methodically, I make use of a novel database relying on the committees’ protocols of 60 policy issues for four legislations (1999 to 2015), which are analysed with quantitative text analyses. The findings will contribute to combine theories on issue salience, on interest groups’ success and on lobbying activities within the parliament.