Policy Specificity and Effective Lawmaking
P14-1
Presented by: Craig Volden
When proposing new policies, is it better to write specific, detailed plans, or to include sufficient ambiguity to gain broad support while allowing potential coalition partners to fill in the details? Put simply, how does the nature of a proposal’s initial policy content influence its path toward adoption? In this paper, we employ Lauterbach’s (2021) measures of policy content, noting that the level of policy specificity varies systematically across bill sponsors in the U.S. Congress. We then examine the extent to which detailed policy content combines with bill sponsors’ institutional positions to explain which bills find success at each stage of the lawmaking process – from action in committee, to passing the House, to becoming law. Our results suggest that writing more detailed bills can enhance a Representative’s lawmaking effectiveness, but only if she is in a position of institutional influence in the House (including being a member of the majority party, a committee chair, or serving on the committee of referral), and only in lawmaking stages over which they exert particular influence. For Representatives who do not hold such positions, writing more specific and detailed bills detracts from their lawmaking effectiveness. They instead benefit from offering more general proposals, with less specificity, leaving others the task of filling in the details.