When states use the bureaucracy mainly to co-opt elites, what are the consequences of introducing more centralized, professional bureaucrats? Do they substitute for the status-quo system or complement it? What are the consequences on the welfare of the general population?

I explore this question in the historical context of late Ancien Regime France. The bureaucracy was then mainly composed of “venal” officeholders, who purchased their positions: this made them dependent on the stability of the regime and provided short-term funds to the state, but the state had only limited control over them. From the late 17thcentury, the monarchy introduced new non-venal bureaucrats, the intendants, who did not purchase their positions and could be dismissed at will. The central state could control intendants more easily, and for this reason they are often considered as proto-modern bureaucrats.

I analyze data on these two different kinds of bureaucrats. I take advantage of digitized National Archives inventories and build a novel dataset of more than 125,000 venal officeholders during the 1724-1790 period. I combine it with information on intendants and finance ministers’ tenure. I explore whether the appointment of centralized bureaucrats limits or promotes the proliferation of venal offices.

In preliminary results, I find that the appointment of a new intendant in a province systematically leads to the sale of new fiscal office positions, which points to a complementarity mechanism. I then explore the broader welfare consequences of these dynamics, using data on popular rebellions.