Why do politicians engage in corruption? And why do citizens habitually elect (and reelect) them? We present results of a pre-registered analysis of experimental survey research conducted in Italy, Brazil, and Pakistan. We survey representative samples of adult voters and the universe of national and first-level subnational legislators in these countries to study their tolerance for corruption via corruption-related vignettes and their beliefs about the prevalence of corruption and anti-corruption enforcement in their countries. The survey includes an experimental manipulation to assess respondents' willingness to engage in deception. The analysis investigates differences between legislators and citizens in each country as well as the patterns of differences amongst the three countries, which represent vastly different levels of economic development. We also study whether respondents who are more willing to engage in deception exhibit greater tolerance for corruption. Finally, a follow-up experimental component studies whether politicians align their willingness to enforce anti-corruption legislation when given precise information about the preferences of their voters.