13:10 - 14:50
P13
Room:
Room: Meeting Room 2.2
Panel Session 13
Eleanor Florence Woodhouse - Corruption by Politicians Reduces Pro-Social Behavior by Bureaucrats: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh
Niklas Harder - Can local administration boost naturalization rates? Estimating the effect of local naturalization campaigns.
Anders Ejrnæs - Is there an education gap in trust in public authorities? Evidence from a Multilevel Analysis
Corruption by Politicians Reduces Pro-Social Behavior by Bureaucrats: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh
P13-1
Presented by: Eleanor Florence Woodhouse
Eleanor Florence Woodhouse 1, Christian Schuster 1, Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling 2, Kim Sass Mikkelsen 3
1 University College London
2 Nottingham University
3 Roskilde University
Numerous studies assess how politicians control and shape bureaucracy. Yet, how politicians as role models affect the norms and behaviors of bureaucrats has not been studied. This is a curious omission, in light of evidence that social norms shape bureaucratic behavior. We address this gap for one key behavior of political leaders: corruption. We argue that corruption by politicians models self-serving behavior as a norm, which undermines bureaucrats' perception of the state as a provider of services for others, leading to a reduction in their pro-social behavior. We provide evidence for this argument through a lab-in-the-field experiment with bureaucrats in Bangladesh. In a self-persuasion prime experiment, bureaucrats who recall episodes of political corruption donate significantly lower real monetary amounts to charity. Our findings underscore the importance of political leaders as role models for bureaucrats and the damage that political corruption does for pro-social behavior in bureaucracies