The scholarship on “border walls” in international relations is relatively scarce despite the fact that states take measures quite often to protect their borders. The various causes and consequences of these walls is hardly studied in a systematic way.

This paper seeks to fill this gap by examining the effects of constructing these walls have on leaders’ tenure. My theoretical point of departure is the Selectorate Theory that was introduced by Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003). The theory stipulates that states’ policy choices are shaped by leaders’ motivation to stay in power and the institutional framework within the country.

Assuming that leaders will do everything they can to stay in power, they will also build walls – as one policy option at their disposal - if they think it as beneficial to surviving in power. Hence, using this as a political tool should prolong their tenure, or help their re-election bid, whenever relevant. This should be more pronounced the more democratic a country is. This paper attempts to test this link by using the Carter and Poast’s dataset of all border walls 1800-2014.