A well-functioning democracy relies on ‘good’ politicians being elected,whereas ‘bad’ politicians who breach liberal democratic norms or misusepublic funds are punished. Yet, there are many instances in which badpoliticians are elected by voters. This paper examines whether the ac-tions of other politicians are effective in countering the election of politi-cians who have engaged in authoritarian behavior. We argue that morecostly actions by fellow partisan politicians will have a greater effect onthe election chances of authoritarian politicians than less costly actions bypoliticians from another party. We test this in a pre-registered conjointexperiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in the UK. Thefindings show that voters are less likely to elect ‘bad’ politicians, when theyare criticized by fellow Members of Parliament, and that such actions areparticularly effective when they are costly. These findings have importantimplications, as they show that politicians, and especially co-partisans, canplay an important role in ensuring that authoritarian politicians are notelected.