Decision-making in international organizations frequently takes place in the ‘shadow of hierarchy.’ Indeed, even in the absence of voting, powerful member-states regularly influence the operations of international organizations through both formal and informal channels—often to the detriment of relatively weaker states. In this paper, I argue that state representatives from weaker states can leverage this unequal power distribution and overcome institutional constraints under two conditions. First, state delegates who increase their autonomy vis-à-vis their home authorities can act relatively independent in governing bodies. Second, individual traits, such as experience and skills, can augment their bargaining position vis-à-vis an international organization. Together, these conditions can make state representatives ‘respected individuals,’ who enjoy particular standing in decision-making—from staff, management, and other state delegates. To illustrate this interaction of structure and individuals, I draw on insights from 16 semi-structured interviews with Executive Board members of the International Monetary Fund—a ‘typical’ case for decision-making of international organizations. I find that representatives from multi-country constituencies are better equipped to speak independently in discussions (in contrast to those from powerful member-states, who tend to follow their authorities’ instructions more closely). Further, by drawing on extensive experience in the Fund, these individuals can achieve disproportionate weight in negotiations. My argument plausibly extends beyond the IMF to other international institutions and multilateral negotiations. In doing so, I show how to combine structural and individual explanations to advance our understanding of decision-making in international affairs.