Most contemporary autocracies hold elections. Does the public value these elections and, if so, do they value them enough to punish incumbents that subvert elections? We examine this question in the case of contemporary Russia by examining whether individuals withdraw support from regime leaders when local elections are cancelled. Over the past 20 years, most Russian cities have replaced their directly elected mayors with appointed chief executives. This paper utilizes the largest dataset on public opinion ever assembled in Russia--containing over 1.4 million polling responses drawn from two decades of polling by Russia's top polling agencies--to analyze how the cancellation of elections in Russia's large cities has affected public attitudes toward the authorities. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that election cancellation reduces support for President Vladimir Putin. The effect is stronger among the young, who are presumably more likely to value elections. We also find that the effect is stronger in more democratic regions and in cities where mayoral elections were competitive. This suggests that the public is more likely to punish incumbents for canceling elections when those elections are perceived as meaningful.