How can we evaluate the quality of electoral representation if voter preferences, priorities and beliefs are partly shaped by elite political communication? I consider six approaches commonly used to evaluate electoral representation, and argue that all are problematic if public opinion both influences and is influenced by elite behavior. I propose and defend a new measurable criterion for effective popular control over elected representatives (and therefore effective electoral representation), 'communicative representation': the degree to which speech by elected legislators represents, as well as responds to, the entire distribution of voter preferences (communicative congruence and communicative responsiveness, respectively). Low (high) communicative representation implies that political actors with certain preferences and priorities have disproportionate (proportionate) presence and influence in public debate, and so disproportionate (proportionate) political power. I illustrate the feasibility and value of this approach by analyzing communicative congruence on immigration and welfare spending in the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2015.