Restrictions on freedom of expression, information sharing, and free media have always been part of the authoritarian tool kit. Authoritarian regimes understand the danger of an informed citizenry to the status quo and therefore employ many resources at developing strategies directed at manipulating the media landscape. Simultaneously, increased globalization and access to information through the internet have forced many autocrats to think creatively when seeking to manipulate and control the flow of information. This paper explores how media companies behave in response to legislature aimed at rewarding loyal media actors. To do this I exploit a recent Russian media reform of regional television in a quasi-experimental design. I use a differences-in-differences strategy to investigate how regime distribution of spoils affects levels of pro-regime bias in news content. I employ an original and comprehensive dataset of regional news broadcasts across Russia covering more than half a decade. Furthermore, I use a novel approach to measure levels of pro-regime bias in news broadcasts in autocratic settings using supervised machine learning. Additionally, this paper illuminates how company ownership as well as demographic, political and socio-economic factors across regions influence company response to receiving legislative spoils from the regime.