This dissertation contributes to the ongoing discussion on great power competition in the context of the anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) challenge in the Western Pacific. Advances in precision-strike capabilities by countries that have been considered adversaries or competitors in recent US national security documents threaten the US’s power projection capabilities. Anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), as well as anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), can if employed effectively, contest the command of the commons. This changing strategic environment has prompted several commentators and analysts to suggest a US response which implies developing anti-ship missile (ASM) warfare capabilities that can turn around the A2/AD logic to deter power projection by revisionist powers. In contrast to other domains of military equipment, the United States is not so clearly ahead of its European allies in ASM technology. The US’s relationship with its European allies is marked by geostrategic cooperation, on the one hand, and industrial competition, on the other hand. European-made ASMs not only compete successfully against American ones in the global ASM market, but the US is currently also dependent on ASCMs of Norwegian origin. What explains this variation in ASM warfare capabilities between Western countries? Most of the IR literature assumes that military technology spreads easily, especially to a country like the United States with the world’s largest defense industry. According to this view, catching up ought to be easy for the US. I show, however, that the variation in this capability depends on the technological challenges imposed by ASM warfare.