This study is an attempt to examine how authoritarian successor parties affect democratic backsliding. Analyzing those cases of Asian countries that experienced democratization, it examines how the transitional paths shape the rule of the electoral game and its outcomes for authoritarian successor parties and whether the path of transformation (i.e., Taiwan, India, Turkey, and Pakistan), different from that of transplacement (i.e., Mongolia and South Korea) or replacement (i.e., Philippines), helps democratic consolidation or causes backsliding. It assumes that democratic consolidation is determined by perceptional and behavioral acceptance of democratic rule, and delves into the power relationship between main political players of the transition game and their political strategies and circumstances: 1) political parties-authoritarian ruling parties and pro-democratic opposition parties, 2) authoritarian rulers-military and civilian, and 3) prodemocratic opposition parties, civil society, and international facilitators, like U.S. and the UN.