Why do many countries struggle to adopt measures to avoid fiscal crises? We test the prominent "war of attrition" theory, which suggests voters seek to delay stabilization until a period when they are unlikely to shoulder the burden of fiscal reform. As opposing groups attempt to wait each other out, debt burdens and the cost of stabilization grow. Despite a prominent theoretical basis, there is little empirical evidence of this strategic delay. Here, we test the implications of this theory for ethnic politics through an original survey experiment fielded in Kenya with 2000 respondents. Notably, we investigate how variation in perceptions of victory for co-ethnic politicians influences support for adopting reforms before or after the 2022 general election. We then plan to run a follow-up survey after the election to examine if preferences change in light of the electoral results. When individuals expect co-ethnic candidates to win, they prefer to delay reforms until this candidate enters government, while those who expect co-ethnic candidates to lose prefer to introduce reforms immediately. This work speaks to a long-standing claim in the economic reform literature, but while most research assumes fiscal preferences fall along a left-right dimension, we show that ethnic divisions are salient in the politics of debt reduction.