I propose to investigate the origins and geo-economic implications of an emerging cyberspace policy known as “offensive cyber” in the context of digital sovereignty. Emerging from Britain’s academic discourse and implemented into government policy in recent months, the concept of offensive cyber is likely to have profound ramifications across the expansive digital markets, regional currency, vulnerable industries, and national sovereignty in Europe.

My proposal consists of two arguments. First, I show that the concept has many roots in the reality of digital sovereignty, including (1) British solution to the systemic vulnerability of digital space and the experiences of EU partners undergoing cyber attacks, (2) recognition that existing international legal and normative frameworks have been inadequate (I made this point in the Journal of Cybersecurity in 2021), and (3) emerging consensus that a strategy solely relied upon defense and deterrence - common among European nations - is untenable.

Second, I consider a range of implications of offensive cyber on the digital economy of EU nations. I show how offensive cyber can exacerbate the European digital space by provoking hackers to go against the economic infrastructure. I will demonstrate how the concept’s proliferation would undermine the digital sovereignty as a whole, increase the number of ransomware and destructive malware operations against vulnerable industries, such as insurance, education, and energy, and weaken the power of the Euro due to the widespread use of cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies by a series of hackers and government agencies that deploy them on their behalf.