Does forceful intervention in the name of protecting civilians actually improve citizens' welfare? We develop a model where an autocrat invests in repression to reduce the threat of being ousted by a domestic opposition while a third party may engage in humanitarian in tervention, removing a leader in an effort to benefit civilians. The third party faces a dilemma: while the threat of intervention might reduce the autocrat's investment in repression, this might produce political instability and possibly more repression against civilians. By maintaining repression relatively low via the threat of intervention, a third party animated by humanitarian concerns de facto increases the vulnerability of the autocrat to domestic challenges. When domestic challenges can lead to a power vacuum and prolonged internal conflict, we show that citizens would benefit from the presence of a third party less committed to preventing repression, and more concerned about political stability. By tolerating a higher level of repression, a third party primarily concerned about political stability can limit the possibility of prolonged internal conflicts and ultimately ensure a lower level of repression against civilians.