Why has rising inequality not led to more redistribution? And what explains the cross-national variation in countries’ response (or lack thereof) to inequality? Combining insights from electoral geography with political economy models of redistributive politics and partisan strategies, I argue that the spatial distribution of inequality undermines the political logic of redistribution when elections are held under plurality rule. When inequality in the median district is lower than in the nation as a whole, demand for redistributive policies and voting for left parties is concentrated in few districts. This limits the number of seats left-wing parties gain in elections while reducing left-wing parties’ incentives to offer pro-redistributive platforms. I provide empirical evidence for my argument using cross-national data on regional inequalities, local-level administrative and geo-coded survey data from the United Kingdom, and comparative manifesto data. The findings offer a new explanation for why some countries redistribute more than others, suggesting that political geography can weaken political responses to inequality and electoral representation.