Highest courts make final decisions but lack the means to enforce them. Consequently, their external environment can change utility calculations behind judicial decision-making, as well as the subsequent policy implementation by governments. This raises the question: How do external actors impact judicial decision-making? I investigate the impact external actors take on judicial decision-making and outcomes at the French and German constitutional court. External actors, which constitutes the sets of actors which are not formally associated with the court, differ in their scope of issues, goals and resources, which shape their influence-taking. Based on the institutional setting, degree of politization and reputational concerns, I examine how final decisions of Justices are impacted by external actors. I argue that external actors shape these expectations as they speak to highest courts. Decision transparency – the pivotal moderator of a given case and its outcome – is derived from the institutional setting and the communication between the Judiciary and external actors. I find that the French court, where partisan considerations are more dominant, is more reputation-dependent compared to the German Court. Results suggest that the latter, in comparison, is more resilient to political discourse and opposition. This has major implications for our understanding of how the environment shapes the interaction between the political and the judicial sphere.