Recent scholarship of autocratic politics suggests elite coalitions armed with a well-institutionalized ruling party are resilient to autocratic breakdown because such an institutionalized ruling party can prevent elite defection. However, other studies also suggest that party-based dictatorships also collapse through elite divisions which are generated through government policy choices, political appointments, and decisions on rent distribution. This article attempts to identify the conditions under which elite divisions lead to regime change in party-based dictatorships. Specifically, we show that whether elite divisions lead to regime collapse depends upon the historical origins of ruling parties. Using the V-Party dataset, we show that elite divisions within the ruling party decrease the levels of democratization as well as the risk of authoritarian breakdown, when ruling parties originate from ideology-based conflicts. Our findings suggest that dictators can use strong partisan ties to maintain elite cohesion among loyalists and legitimize the use of repressive measures to deal with defectors even if elite divisions occur. Consequently, elite divisions fail to credibly challenge the government and make it difficult for opposition figures and activists to rally against the extant regime effectively.