How do authoritarian regimes employ Social Media to increase the efficacy of their repression apparatus? The use of Social Media by opposition groups in the recent wave of unrest in the Middle East was touted as a solution to the mobilization problem in authoritarian regimes. While non-democratic regimes, in the beginning, relied on less effective passive techniques, such as blocking the Internet, to limit the positive effects of Social Media on mass mobilization, they later adopted more proactive approaches, such as fabricating news and manipulating online data, to increase their stability. These cyber-oppressive strategies, despite their recent popularity among repressive states, have remained understudied in the literature. This paper argues that since repressing nonviolent dissent is more costly than violent ones, oppressive states prefer their oppositions resort to violence. They, therefore, not only do not limit the Social Media accounts of pro-violent dissidents but also support and promote this discourse. Instead, the primary focus of pro-government Social Media accounts is on targeting and defusing users who support and encourage civil resistance. I evaluate these theoretical arguments using a dataset of more than 5 million tweets by Iranian government-backed accounts, which are identified and flagged by Twitter’s Integrity Project.