Parties in contemporary world use simultaneously programmatic and non-programmatic strategies to link voters routinely. They do so through the introduction of different mechanisms in order to attract heterogeneous constituencies. Yet the literature on party-linkages do not offer a compelling explanation of the drivers and causal mechanisms of the hybrid linkage strategies. On the one side, Kitchelt's framework assume that mixing different linkages is implausible, since both strategies require specializations, organizational structures, and it is deemed too expensive. On the other hand, more flexible models, such Diversification of Linkages, Segmented Representation, Division of Labour, and Non-Policy model, focus the analysis on the variation of linkages across district socioeconomic conditions: programmatic portfolio appealing for wealthier citizens while particularistic distribution to poor voters. In this article I introduce a new framework to explain the drivers of hybrid linkage strategies at the local level. Using a mix-method strategy and intensive fieldwork in three urban Chilean municipalities with different socioeconomic features, I account that hybrid linkages are explained by two variables: 1. demand for targeted distribution (bottom-up mechanism) and 2. the political compromise of municipal authorities with programmatic distribution (top-down). I argue that hybrid linkages are observed when local authorities possess programmatic compromise and concurrently engage in quid-pro-quo, which in turn is triggered by local associations pushing for targeted distribution. The framework introduced in this research is currently being explored surveying leaders from local associations and municipal authorities from 52 municipalities in the Region Metropolitana, Chile.