Whereas most research in legislative studies has focused on explaining legislative organization or on the consequences of parliamentary rules for the work of specific parliamentary institutions, little research has focused on the extra-legislative consequences of legislative organization. At the same time, existing research in public opinion has repeatedly pointed to the crucial role of institutions for the level of democratic consent among winners and losers at the citizen level. In this research, however, the legislature has not figured prominently among the institutional determinants of satisfaction with democracy. In this paper, I bring these two literatures together and analyze the effect of legislative rules on the satisfaction with democracy MPs express. I analyze the power attributed to opposition MPs and parties during the policy-making process and its link to satisfaction with democracy of government and opposition MPs. By focusing on legislatures – the institutions where losers of democratic elections are represented – I present a more direct link between institutional organization and satisfaction with democracy of these losers at the elite level. Results from logistic multi-level models show that the way parliaments are organized does influence the individual level of satisfaction with democracy among representatives. More power of opposition parties enhances the satisfaction of opposition MPs but does not necessarily reduce that of government representatives.