In representative democracies the delegation from voters to legislators is almost always mediated by political parties. Leaders of these parties command resources, such as control over rank-and-file members future political careers, which they can use to maintain party discipline. We study how some incumbents, towards the end of their current term, learn that they will not get renominated by their party. How does such a negative re-election shock impact parliamentary behavior? We compare changes in the behavior of incumbents that lose fights at the nomination meeting, to change in the behavior of uncontested incumbents using a difference-in-discontinuity design. We leverage fine-grained data varying at the politician-day level to study both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of legislative behavior using votes in parliament, bill sponsorship, and legislative speech. Our results show that lame duck status have a strong negative effect on the probability of showing up in parliament to vote. We find, however, no clear evidence that lame duck status affect the extent to which legislators deviate from the party line. Our findings align well with the citizen-candidate framework, where candidates have fixed ideological positions that do not vary based on electoral incentives.