Political Connections, Patronage, and Consumer Attitudes: Evidence from Morocco
P5-01
Presented by: Abhit Bhandari, Erin York
Clientelism alters citizens’ behavior as voters, but can it also impact citizens as consumers? A substantial body of scholarship examines the political consequences of clientelism in developing countries. Yet, the broader economic consequences of clientelism remain unclear. We argue that despite voting for politicians who offer targeted goods, citizens abstain from financial transactions with these politicians in the future. Clientelistic politicians, by demonstrating their willingness to bend rules in the electoral process, lead consumers to believe they will also be untrustworthy in a transactional environment. We test this theory using evidence from a conjoint experiment in Morocco, a country where politicians often have one foot in the private sector. The results demonstrate the linkages between patronage networks and consumer behavior in contexts characterized by clientelism and suggest that political support does not translate to economic support.