Accountability trade-off can make local officials provide different types of goods for the local population. This study argues that the selection rule, which defines the accountability paths for local officials, can significantly impact the specifics of budget allocation. Using originally collected information on approximately nine million city-level public procurement contracts in Russia, I explore mayors' choices in budget allocation by looking at what types of goods they purchase. Each contract provides a description of goods that are procured. I utilize these contract descriptions to classify the type of goods that are obtained: infrastructural (for instance, construction contracts) or social (for instance, provision of commodities for educational and medical facilities). I use a set of contracts that were financed by the city-level budgets and apply structural topic modeling to identify the types of goods which local budgets are most likely to fund. This allows me to characterize differences in budget allocation preferences and explore how these differences can be explained by institutional features of cities and by individual mayors' characteristics. The paper predicts that the local mayors’ selection rule can affect the type of goods on which local officials spend budget resources. It also suggests that the main effects are explained by local officials’ career concerns mechanism.