The long-lasting conflict in eastern Ukraine and potential new waves of escalation raise two questions: how the EU and its partners should react to this development; and whether economic sanctions on Russia are a suitable foreign policy tool for the US and the EU. Moving beyond the trade destruction effect of sanctions discussed in previous literature, this paper focuses on the effects on third parties and potential beneficiaries, which is often overlooked in existing research. By disconnecting economies, sanctions create opportunities for third parties to step in. But can this nullify other efforts, e. g. if the third party is (another) autocratic state? Do economic restrictions and outside pressure thus ‘push’ autocratic regimes closer together? This paper hypothesizes that China deepened its politico-economic ties with Russia in response to the sanctions imposed by the EU and the US and might thus benefit from the disconnect between the economies of Russia and the EU and the US. Using a gravity model approach with random and fixed effects specifications, this paper presents evidence that a negative trade diversion effect at the beginning of the sanctioning period turns positive after a few years, especially with China . Besides evidence on the product level of sanctioned products, the reorientation of trade flows can also be observed on more aggregate levels of measurement. In sum, the findings emphasize the need to evaluate potential unintended effects of policies on third parties in general while economic sanctions may run counter to long-term strategic and foreign policy goals.