How do individuals develop their political preferences? A wealth of literature has tried to answer this question relying on intrinsic motivations. A smaller body of literature has focused the role of extrinsic motivations such as social norms. This literature has argued that perceptions of what others deem acceptable is an important factor determining the preferences individuals develop and their willingness to express them. This literature has two main shortcomings. First, it lacks a broader theory as to which political platforms are stigmatized and why. Second, there is no real-world evidence that individuals self-censor counter-normative preferences. This paper aims to overcome these shortcomings. Theoretically, I argue that there are two political platforms that are likely to be stigmatized in advanced industrial democracies: successor parties in post-authoritarian countries and radical- right parties. Empirically, I exploit the peculiar the Spanish voting procedure that makes individuals vote in a way that is observable to others. I exploit variation in this level of "publicness" of voting choices to provide real-world evidence that individuals self-censor preferences for successor parties and radical-right parties. The findings will highlight the role of peer pressure and self-regulation in inhibiting behavior at odds with democratic values.