Existing studies show that the opposition party in a two-party system, disadvantaged by the status quo dimensions of issue contention, is more likely to introduce new issue positions radically different from the incumbent consensus. The losing party hopes that the new issue so polarizes the electorate that it produces clearer party choices, stimulates participation, and draws new voters. This paper examines the use of misinformation for polarizing the electorate on a new radical issue dimension. While political elites routinely employ misinformation to polarize voters, its strategic purpose and its micro-level implications for voters remain poorly understood. We draw on an experiment embedded in a representative survey conducted after West Bengal’s 2021 elections. In West Bengal, the opposition party sought to polarize voters on the government’s role in matters of religion. On this issue, a super-majority of voters preferred secular government. The opposition spread false news alleging government favoritism towards religious out-groups; hoping to polarize the electorate into two groups, those wanting a secular government (continuing to support the incumbent) and those wanting a majoritarian government (and therefore switching support to the opposition). Empirically, we find that the misinformation strategy failed, for three reasons. First, latent demand for the radical policy was very low. Second, the issue reinforced instead of cutting across existing partisan cleavages. Third, relatedly, because misinformation reinforced partisan priors, existing supporters of the opposition party were most likely believe it. Thus, instead of polarizing the larger electorate and gaining new voters, the new entrant polarized their own voters.