We study policymakers’ strategic incentives, in a world where voters care about multiple (possibly correlated) dimensions, and learn via experience. We build upon models of partisan identification (e.g., Fiorina 1978) that argue voters choose party affiliation based on their objective experiences under different partisan regimes. We augment this framework by considering voters who think holistically across policy areas, so that observing the outcome on one dimension allows them to draw cross-issue inferences about the effectiveness of multiple components of broader policy programs. In our model, an incumbent enacts a multidimensional policy and voters learn by observing the policy’s outcome on each issue. In equilibrium, the incumbent’s policy choice endogenously influences how much voters learn. As a result, when choosing policy the incumbent must consider how potential outcomes on each dimension will influence subsequent voter beliefs and preferences. We show that the incumbent’s incentives to either focus on a single issue or act on multiple policy dimensions depend on the strength of the correlation across different areas, as well as his ex-ante electoral strength. Furthermore, the incumbent is more likely to act on a secondary dimension when voters care less about it. Finally, the possibility to act on a secondary dimension can induce more or less extremism on the primary one, depending on whether the incumbent is electorally leading or trailing.